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This chapter attempts to situate the rise of market-based conservation policy, and its 
associated theoretical and policy frameworks such The Economics of Biodiversity and 
Ecosystem Services within a wider history of what might be termed financialisation. Outlining 
a new chapter in the long history of ontological adjustment of  ecological science to 
dominant accounts of political economy, this chapter explores the emergence of a novel 
political economy of extinction. This can be analysed in the transformations of theory: the 
reframing of the sixth extinction crisis within the neoliberal idiom of ‘natural capital’ and  
‘ecosystem services’ reflects a history of the reprocessing of political and scientific ecological 
discourse in order to better accommodate it to reigning economic doctrines. TEEB and other 
articulations of market-based conservation  do little to question the dominant economic 
theory that has licensed the financialisation of social, political and economic life and led to 
our current global economic crisis. As a species of power, it can also be analysed in the 
social connections of the corporate boardroom: where the  professional authority, executive 
expertise, epistemic frameworks and political projects of senior conservation ecologists 






 While the people of the world financial centres in the United States, 
Europe and Japan continue to meander through the strange aftermath of the Wall St 
financial crisis of 2008, their economies shedding employment and accumulating 
immense quantities of central bank liquidity and public debt, the biosphere is in 
negative growth territory, continually being reduced in size, diversity and complexity. 
In the material world of the ‘real economy; deforestation, land clearing and the 
mining of oceanic fisheries continues apace. Greenhouse emissions continue their 
exponential rise, and climate change threatens to unravel abiding biotic relationships 
in existing refugia.  
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 Coral reefs, ‘the rainforests of the sea’ are so threatened by warming events 
and ocean acidification that some marine scientists are calling for the rapid upscaling 
of a raft of prophylactic ocean-engineering technologies. These range from covering 
vast areas of the reef with giant pool covers, to capturing and re-releasing reef 
species after genetically engineering them to tolerate heat and acidity stress beyond 
the range to which they are evolved to withstand (Rau et al 2012). While estimating 
and predicting rates of extinctions is a dark art, biologists estimate that the 
irreversible consignment of species to extinction is now occurring at somewhere 
between 100 and 10000 times the ‘normal’ deep time rate (May et al. 1995; Pimm & 
Raven 2000; Lawton & May 2008). In the deep geological time of evolutionary 
history, the biosphere finds itself on the precipice of the sixth mass extinction crisis 
since life emerged (Barnosky et al 2011).  
The biopolitical project of the ‘crisis disicipline’ of conservation biology 
(Soule 1985: 727) once proceeeded on an ethical ground opposed to the heedless 
destruction of forms of life. The ethics of intrinsic value, in which life-forms exist of 
themselves and for themselves independent of human meaning systems, was married 
to the quest for meticulously value-free scientific account of the parts and wholes of 
biotic communities and ecological system: a rigorously non-anthropocentric ethos 
and episteme: the better to preserve the extra-economic fundament of life from the 
depredations of ‘the economy’. As is widely recognised, attempts to reduce the 
gathering pace of extinction have failed under the aegis of the 1992 Convention on 
Biological Diversity and the ethos of the protected areas paradigm (Butchart et al 
2010). While only the most naïve idealists would interpret this as a pure failure of 
philosophy, a sense of pragmatic inevitability has pervaded the transformation of 
conservation politics by the inexorable rise of the concept of ‘ecosystem services’ to 
the influential heights of international policymaking over the last decde. A now 
familiar revolution has occurred within conservation biology and institutional 
practices,a move to fully integrate it with the sine qua non of anthropocentric policy 
languages, margnialist economics as reconfigured by the political philosophy of 
neoliberalism. As the realisation slowly dawns that ecological erosion in lockstep 
with climate change, of which it is both cause and effect, will fundamentally threaten 
the lifeworld of human populations, so too does the knowledge that it is too late for 
conservation alone, systematic restoration must also be undertaken to re-connect 
eroding and isolated remnants of the relatively ‘wild’ biosphere. Yet because the 
return to ecological pasts implied by ‘conservation’ and ‘restoration’ is, given the 
cumulative irreversibility of extinctions and global warming, strictly impossible, the 
shift in focus becomes the ethically agnostic problem of re-engineering the resilience 
of the directly economic functions of ecosystems, for example, the loss of crop 
pollination through the ‘colony collapse disorder’ confronting bee populations 
worldwide. 
 The shift in the philosophy of extinction accomplished by these developments 
is marked: the biosphere is no longer to be protected from the depredations of the 
unlimited economic growth, to be allowed to ‘let live’ in a separate, delimited space 
and a sphere of values, as in the protected areas paradigm, or in the theoretically 
unlimited (but politically neutralized) sovereign protection of the US Endangered 
Species legislation. As Australian Environment Minister Peter Garrett put it in a 
(2009) speech to conservation professionals,  
With 1,750 species on the threatened list it is time Australian governments 
began to deal with regional ecosystems rather than adopting a band-aid 
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approach to dealing with species under stress […] While […] we'll have to 
act in an urgent way from time to time to prevent their extinction, it won't 
always be effective to keep tackling them one by one. We shouldn't focus 
solely on the sick and dying, but should work to build the resilience of 
ecosystems and landscapes, to ensure, if you like, that the hospital waiting 
rooms are a little less full and the health care a lot more preventative.  
Perhaps nothing signifies what is at stake more clearly than the name of the 
CBD’s new transnational scientific institute, dedicated to collating, analysing  and 
advancing state of the art scientific knowledge to inform the political community: the 
International Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES). The model 
organisation for this is of course the IPCC, which in its quest to communicate state-
of the-art climate science, did not think to pre-empt neoliberal styles of thought by 
dubbing itself the ‘International Panel on Climate Services’. In the same move that 
reconstitutes nature as a form of capital that will yield us interest in the form of 
‘ecosystem services’, the market comes to be naturalised.  
What remains of the ‘wild type’ biosphere, and indeed all of its utilitarian effects 
(rainfall, flood mitigation, crop pollination) are to be properly evaluated and fully 
internalized inside the economy by becoming monetized, capitalized, and traded as 
‘vital infrastructure assets’. On the ground, private and state actors are fostering a 
host of experimental biodiversity banks, markets for various ecosystems services and 
for biodiversity ‘offsets’, and development projects involving payments for ecosystem 
services. At the level of the United Nations, this has culminated in theoretical 
attempts to codify ‘The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity’ (TEEB) (Sukhdev 
2010, Kumar 2010, ten Brink 2011, Bishop 2012).  
 The rise of ‘ecosystem services’ has been accompanied by an immense 
mushroom-shaped literature across the grey literatures of Big Conservation and 
international policy for a, and the journals of conservation biology and ecological 
economics where has wide if often uneasy professional acceptance in these areas. 
Certainly, the problems it seeks to address are serious. How to finance the 
maintenance of existing biosphere reserves and national parks in the postcolonial 
South? How denationalised capital flows, and the permanent fiscal crisis of the 
environmental state brought on by structural adjustment, and the need to export 
primary commodities to service debt. How to re-establish habitat connectivity 
between the isolated islands of ‘biosphere reserves’ across landscapes privately 
owned and dedicated to economic production, without a massive program of land 
nationalisation? Who among us would not hope to witness, after a bit of microcredit 
and ‘social innovation’, a flourishing of small, medium and large conservation 
providers, the rise of a productive sector specialising in large scale ecological 
restoration and long-term prudential ecological management. It would be wonderful 
to live in a world where it was so profitable to nurture the well being of the biotic 
community that ‘providers’ of ‘ecological services’ could outbid coal miners for land 
containing coal.  
 In order to counter this sentimental utopia, this chapter seeks to situate 
the rise of the ‘economics of biodiversity and ecosystem services’ within a wider 
history of ‘financialisation’. Concisely, the term financialisation refers to the “process 
whereby financial services, broadly construed, take over the dominant economic, 
cultural, and political role in a national economy” (Phillips, 2008). This process of 
course, is a global one, insofar as the denationalization and liberalization of finance 
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has been a continuous project of US foreign policy, IMF structural adjustment 
policies and WTO treaty making.  
 In this chapter my critique of ‘ecosystem services’ is more particularly 
interested in the fact that this fundamental reframing of the problem of biosphere 
destruction offers no resistance or critique, and adapts itself quite seamlessly to the 
currently hegemonic account of financial markets, knowledge and the political  
derived from the Austrian neoliberal Freidrich von Hayek, and the standard 
neoclassical economics of permanent growth in equilibrium.  Through the concept  
of ‘ecosystem services’, the ecological scientist thus risks becoming too well attuned 
to the neoliberal ontology of nature, knowledge and political morality .  
 The essence of neoliberalism as a political philosophy is in the social 
epistemology of the Austrian economist Friedrich Hayek, who struck fast to the 
view that nature and society are both so complex that only market prices are the 
only reliable form of collective information gathering, processing and distribution. Its 
inscrutable ‘decisions’ on how to organise economic life, even if they seem irrational, 
cruel and unjust, in fact always surpass the expert knowledge assembled by 
institutions or scientific organisations, regardless of democratic desires for social 
justice or other purposes – such as addressing the problem of systemic ecological 
degradation. 
 In Hayek’s late philosophy, the market is like the biosphere, insofar as it is 
an evolving,  non-linear and complex adaptive system that thrives on the emergence 
of its own catastrophic turbulence, an evolved order too complex and resilient for 
any centralised from of knowledge to comprehend, much less to predict or control 
(Walker & Cooper 2011). For Hayek, the Market is the highest level attainable of 
collectively organised human knowledge, inaccessible to actual humans apart from 
concise price signals. And yet because we can only know Nature or Society through 
the information distilled and distributed by our own subjective ‘environment’ of 
prices, we can never really know if the biosphere is in crisis, or whether its worth 
doing something about it, until it is actively traded in private exchange.  
 The new political economy of extinction represented by ecosystem 
services, rather reframes the problem in the familiar neoliberal fashion as a ‘market 
failure’ that can be traced not to the inherent inappropriateness of private-profit 
seeking as the solution to particular collective social problems, such as the ecological 
effects of our current growth-at-all-cost economic system, but rather some political 
failure to foster the markets autonomous proliferation of novel market formats, 
property rights and financial instruments (ie. ‘financial innovation’) in the spirit of the 
Mont Pelerin Society member and Chicago School economics-law scholar Ronald 
Coase (1960).  
Hayek’s prescient portrayal of market prices as distributed information 
processing (1945) was later to be incorporated into neoclassical finance theory by 
his Chicago school fellow travellers in the form of the ‘efficient markets hypothesis’ . 
The theoretical bases of the idea that our only hope to conserve and restore the 
biosphere is to have Social integration with Nature mediated and ‘self-regulated’ by 
financial market prices, are ‘grounded’, to use a word inappropriate to in the 
neoliberal finance theories such as the Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH) (Lucas 
1972, that numerous analysts have linked to the phenomena of ‘financialisation’ and 
the ongoing world economic crisis. Thus it seems to me wholly surprising that a 
body financial theory that has failed so spectacularly in the sphere of finance, should 
now be called upon to effect the missing transvaluation of ecological values we so 
desperately need to prevent ‘the economy’ taking the biosphere down altogether. 
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What might the social and political consequences be of seeking to finance 
conservation and restoration by incorporating the problem of extinction within 
more or less the same neoliberal economic doctrines that unleashed the current 
global financial crisis? Is their no better way to reverse mounting ecological 
despoliation than via a comprehensive financialisation of the biosphere? Whose 
interest does the financialisation of biodiversity and ecological preservation serve? 
In the move to depoliticise conservation by subjecting ecosystems and 
species life to evaluation by financial markets (in the form of investment and 
disinvestment ) is also a reorientation of the hierarchy of knowledge. Just as the 
biosphere is to be internalised within economic discourse is one variety of capital 
(financial capital, industrial capital, social capital, natural capital), so too is ecology to 
become a subordinate science to the master science of economics. And just as the 
ecological crisis has not yet falsified the ‘human exemptionalist’ paradigm in 
economics, the deepening economic crisis has not yet falsified the mainstream 
economics of finance, nor has it lead to any political change capable of  unseating the 
financial elite who have, if anything consolidated their financial wealth and political 
influence in and through the crisis, as governments continues to socialise the 
speculative losses of private banking firms in the form of mounting government debt, 
austerity measures, inflationary debt monetisations, central bank purchase of ‘toxic 
assets’, mass unemployment, and in the latest twist from Europe, direct raids on 
ordinary savers bank accounts. Neoliberal politics, it seems, thrives on the very 
disasters it produces (Klein 2007, Cooper 2008, Pellizoni). 
 
A brief genealogy of ecosystem services  
 
Responding to the ‘limits to growth’ debate of the 1970s, mainstream economists 
tended to account for the exhaustion of scarce natural resources – which were 
presumed to be minerals in almost every case - as ‘creative destruction’, an 
opportunity for entrepreneurs to cash in with the next technological substitution. In 
the standard neoclassical model of permanent growth in equilibrium, which denies 
any direct role for natural resources in economic process, a market economy will 
always converge towards a steady rate of growth, which depends only on the rate of 
technological progress and the rate of labor force growth.  Putting aside the 
biophysical challenge to the presumption of infinite industrial expansion (through 
appeals to the coming fusion reactor), they re-framed the problem as a theoretical 
inquiry into the market conditions conducive to an ‘optimal rate of depletion’ 
(Stiglitz 1974a, 1974b, Dasgupta & Heal 1974, Solow 1974). ‘Substitution’ has since 
functioned as a catch all concept to explain away the problem of resource depletion, 
A common thread in these papers was the conjecture that the real problem was in 
fact the absence of futures and risk markets for depletable natural resources. As 
Dasgupta and Heal put it:  
 
“…many of the difficulties that are involved in the making policy 
recommendations about the rate of depletion of exhaustible resources stem 
from the fact that crucial aspects of this problem are inherently uncertain, 
and it is not clear that an adequate class of contingent markets exists.” (1974, 
4) 
 
Faced with global ecological risks, the necessity of complete markets – for every 
conceivable risk, for every ‘savage’ state of nature – becomes critical: “Everything 
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depends upon how traders form their expectations about the future in situations 
where definite information is lacking.” (Heal 1974, 1).  Other economists confidently 
predicted that several hundred years hence, the inexorable depletion of minerals and 
fossil energy would bring about– mirabile dictu ! - an ‘age of infinite substitutability’ 
(Goeller & Weinberg, 1978).  
The term ecosystem services was coined by publicly-engaged ecologists and 
conservation biologists in the 1980s (Ehrlich & Ehrlich 1981, Ehrlich & Mooney 
1983), as a pedagogical device to try to get across to conventional resource 
economists the point that neither human life nor ‘the economy’ could exist without 
the biosphere in something resembling its present form. As Lovelock (1979) has 
observed, absent the geo-transforming effects of the biosphere the Earth would have 
an oxygen-less atmosphere of 98% carbon dioxide, and an annual average 
temperature of around 290ºC.  
 Redirecting the question of the limitation of ‘natural resources’ away from 
minerals and fossil fuels and into the biosphere as background pre-condition for 
human existence, Erlich and Mooney (1983) argued that certain ‘keystone’ species,  
are simply non-substitutable. They are critical as partners in so many symbiotic, 
mutual relationships across the web of life – food, habitat, pollination, seed dispersal, 
soil structuring, ecological engineering- that their loss could cascade in a kind of 
extinction multiplier effect which could degrade and irreversibly alter ecosystems, 
curtailing their productivity and abundance, ultimately unravelling crucial ecosystem 
functions, like temperature regulation, hydrological cycling, soil formation, the cycling 
of C, N and P. Extinction events (‘losses of biodiversity’) are not atomised, discrete 
events, but themselves time-delayed causes of further local, regional and global 
extinctions, as recognised in the biogeographical trope of the ‘extinction debts’ 
(Tilman, 1994, Malanson 2008). Extinctions cascade cumulatively forward shaping the 
fundamental conditions of life into a future stretch of evolutionary time completely 
indifferent to the egoism of that species apt to regard itself as the realisation of the 
telos of life itself.  
In one of the earliest papers to introduce the term ‘ecosystem services’, even 
before the neologism ‘biodiversity’ had been coined, the link between extinction and 
‘human well being’ is baldly stated: 
 
 “all [ecosystem services] will be threatened if the rate of extinctions continues to 
increase” (italics in original, Ehrlich & Ehrlich 1981 cited in Maier 2012, 187). 
 
In practice, this move disclosed a knowledge problem: the precise causal 
relations between an as yet largely un-taxonomised biological diversity (species 
richness, genetic diversity, community diversity) and the ecosystem functions that 
emerge from and condition their existence were under-determined by the classical 
division of ecology into the taxonomic perspective of the biotic community or the 
biophysics of the ‘ecosystem’. Conservation biologists thus proposed that a rigorous 
precautionary policy was warranted towards every particular extinction.  
Arising from recognition of the lack of clarity as to how species loss might 
generate changes in global ecosystems, or how biodiversity was related to 
‘productivity’ as modeled by the International Biosphere-Geosphere program 
(SCOPE 1991), the question has since developed into a whole new subdiscipline in 
ecology called biodiversity and ecosystem function (BEF) research (Tilman 1994, 
Naeem et al 1994, Naeem et al 2009). Yet as Simberloff (2003) notes, studies of 
even the most well documented extinctions, such as disappearance of the sky-
 7 
blackening flocks of the passenger pigeon, barely touch the question of the ecological 
consequences. What if there were, in this and other cases, almost none? Would the 
entire paradigm of justifiying extinction prevention through the functionalist language 
of economic self-interest simply evaporate if ecosystem functions could be equally 
maintained by exotic invasives, or monocultures? 
What is particularly interesting in the rise of decision sciences of triage 
(Bottrill et al 2008, Kareiva and Levin 2003)– given that  conservation efforts attract 
limited funding and must choose which extinction risks to manage -  is the sense that 
each scenario of extinction, bioinvasion or ecosystem destruction can and should be 
brought into analytical focus and evaluated from the perspective of its functional 
value as a contributor to a human life support system. Inadequately explored in the 
immense literature on ecosystem services, is the problem of what happens when 
ecosystem functions as described by ecologists are translated into the entity that 
economists call ecosystem services?   
Since the 1980s, ecologists have made serious efforts to work with 
mainstream economists. This has happened in convocations such as the Beijer 
Institute of Ecological Economics, and in multiauthored papers that have used 
‘ecosystem services’ as a means to cobble together some common intellectual 
ground (Arrow et al 1995). One widely discussed paper co-authored by leading BEF 
ecologists and environmental economists (Costanza et al 1997) estimated the annual 
monetary value of the biosphere’s contribution to human well-being on the order of 
$US 33 trillion, although most of it was ‘outside the market’. Erlich’s student 
Gretchen Daily has been one of the most important popularisers of ecosystem 
services, (Daily 1997; Daily, Ellison and Myers 2002; Daily et al 2009), supported also 
by legal specialists (Salzman 2005) and orthodox finance economists (Chichilnisky 
and Heal). But it  was the publication of the UN Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 
(2005), which adopted the idiom of ecosystem services for its policy framework, that 
did most to catalyse the mushroom-cloud shaped literature on ‘ecosystem services’ 
across journals like Conservation Biology and the increasingly mainstream Ecological 
Economics, the ‘grey’ literatures of governments and natural resource management, 
big ENGOs as The Nature Conservancy, Conservation International and World 
Wildlife Fund, global development institutions (UNEP, WB etc), and the 
transnational networks where scientific and policy-making coalitions are forged 
(Beijer Institute for Ecological Economics, Stockholm Resilience Centre). In the quest 
to ‘demistify materiality’ and ‘hardwire biodiversity and ecosystems into finance’ 
(UNEP-FI 2012), numerous experiments involving markets and other systems of 
payment for ‘ecosystem services’ are underway (Baggethun et al 2010, Kosoy et al 
2008; Koellnor 2008). Along with various ‘species banks’ (Katoomba Group 2012), 
there are also a range ‘offset’ schemes underway, such as the voluntary NSW 
Biobanking scheme, or the the US market for wetlands, which in theory trades 
habitat loss against restoration projects under a ‘cap and trade’ no net loss 
arrangement. Then there is the global Business and Biodiversity Offsets Programme, 
initiated by a consortia of mining and logging interests, in an act of voluntary ‘self 
regulation’, or public relations.   
  Given its origins in a plea for the irreplaceability of natural species and 
communites and the absolute irreversibility of extinction, it is more than a little 
ironic that  ‘ecosystem services’ has become a technology of security designed to 
increase the biosphere’s ‘liquidity’ from the point of view of financial markets. By 
‘securitising’ ecological units and processes into financial assets which can be 
negotiated, exchanged, or substituted on capital markets for cash or other forms of 
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financial capital  (the ‘biodiversity offset’ for example, which trades an act of present 
destruction for a promise of ongoing conservation or future restoration) ‘extinction 
debts’, which are by definition strictly unpayable can become profitable sites of 
financial innovation and portfolio investment. But of course it must be remembered 
that liquidity also presumes the possibility of instantaneous disinvestment. In a world 
where biodiversity protection is to be mediated by global markets for ecosystem 
services, the process of identifying expendable species via triage becomes not so 
much a case of the kind of Taylorist scientific analysis of species utility as it does in 
the BEF literature (Kareiva and Levin 2003), but of rational business decisions to 
write off unprofitable investments, or in the larger market context, according to the  
the speculative affect of euphoria or panic that constitutes volatile financial ‘market 
sentiment’.   
One consequence is a shift in the site of the determination and execution (or 
not) of environmental policy to the boardrooms of transnational corporations, and a 





Financialistion: a cautionary tale 
 
It seems worthwhile to note that key actors involved in the push to reframe 
ecological protection, conservation and restoration as financially profitable business 
activities are also people who have senior roles in the global investment banks at the 
centre of the financial crisis. While the ecosystem services literature often claims to 
be merely providing a means to evaluate nature in land use decisions, the logical 
extension of the strange idea that ‘nature has to pay for itself’ (Daily & Ellison 2002) 
is the project to transform the worlds ecosystems into natural capital assets capable 
of yielding flows of ‘services’ that can be privatised, securitised, and profitably traded 
in global financial markets (Chichilnisky & Heal 1998, 2000). The risk of extinction 
and ecological meltdown is What is at stake in the effort to construct a global 
market in ecosystems services, in the transformation of the figure of the 
conservationist from a woolly naturalist to a  consummate  banking insider? This 
transfiguration is complete in the person of Pavan Sukhdev, the leader of the UNEP 
Green Economy initiative and its project to codify The Economics of Ecosystems and 
Biodiversity. An international career banker and financial ‘innovator’, Sukhdev’s 
credentials include having:  
worked with Deutsche Bank for 14 years. [..] While at Deutsche Bank in 
India, Pavan founded and later chaired [the] Global Markets Centre, Mumbai 
“[…] It is being used by Deutsche Bank’s originations, derivatives structuring, 
trading and distribution teams in equities, credit, fixed income and foreign 
exchange around the globe. (UNEP bio) 
 
 An eloquent activist for the cause of the mainstreaming biodiversity and ecosystem 
erosion, Sukhdev was a key figure in the successive rounds of liberalisation of Indian 
financial markets “instrumental in the evolution of India’s currency and interest rate 
and derivatives markets from 1993 till 1998. He was a member of several Reserve 
Bank of India committees for the development of India’s financial markets, including 
the Sodhani Committee on Foreign Exchange Markets. More recently, he has chaired 
the World Economic Forum’s ‘Global Agenda Council on Ecosystems & Biodiversity, 
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and currently serves on the boards of Conservation International and the Stockholm 
Resilience Centre. 
The purpose of TEEB is to internalise the economic values of Nature into 
decision making at all levels using market pricing (TEEB, 2010: 3, 14; Spash and 
Aslasken 2012). The Synthesis Report indicates that TEEB intends:  
 
“creating a common language for policymakers, business and society that 
enables the real value of natural capital, and the flows of services it provides, 
to become visible and be mainstreamed in decision making”. (TEEB, 2010 
p.24)  
 
We learn about the form of this common language in Ecological and Economic 
Foundations (Pushpam 2010),  the key theoretical book in the TEEB series:  
 
“In economics, 'value' is always associated with trade-offs - that is something 
only has (economic) value if we are willing to give up something in order to 
get or enjoy it. The common metric in economics is monetary valuation...” 
 
As Spash and Aslucken (2012) understand, TEEB is congruent with a philosophy in 
which corporations can do no wrong.   
“TEEB employs the political rhetoric of “getting the price right” to allow 
markets to function efficiently. This involves explaining that, waste sinks have 
no cost for the private sector, and non-market benefits provide no reward to 
the market investor. In this neo-liberal framing private companies that 
destroy and pollute are innocent victims of a failing price system and cannot 
be blamed because they lack the right incentives for ecologically sustainable 
management. So we are told that, “Companies do not clear-cut forests out of 
wanton destructiveness or stupidity. On the whole, they do so because 
market signals [...] make it a logical and profitable thing to do” (TEEB, 2010 
p.9)” 
To give an example of the risks of financialisation, we might look at the food crisis 
that broke in the period 2007 -2008, when the global prices of basic food 
commodities - rice, maize and wheat - soared amid an unprecedented amplification 
of volatility in the worlds grain markets. Rice for example, almost tripled in price 





Figure 1 Index numbers of world trade prices of food grains (Source: 
Ghosh 2010: 76) 
 
Millions of poor worldwide, accustomed to spending much of their income on food 
staples, were immediately thrust into destitution and hunger. According to one 
estimate, of the roughly 2-billion people across the world who spend more than 50 
percent of their income on food, 250 million people joined the ranks of the hungry 
in 2008, bringing the total of the world’s “food insecure” to a peak of 1 billion 
people (Kaufman 2011). Food riots broke out from Haiti to Cairo, and social unrest 
simmered. As the whole sale price eased, Northern media attention turned to the 
stunning collapse of Wall St banks in September 2008 and the Götterdämmerung of 
Bush administration bailing out the banks at the centre of the roiling the global 
financial markets. Even after grain prices eased on world markets, prices did not fall 
in numerous local and national contexts in the South, restricting the poor from 
accessing food with varying degrees of intensity.  
 Noting that grain production continued to keep up with grain consumption, 
economists, and that prices of local millets and other grains not traded in world 
futures markets did not rise, the Indian economist Jayati Ghosh isolated the seismic 
price shifts and ongoing rise in food prices to the generation of a highly profitable 
price bubble as hedge funds and investment banks, including Deutsche Bank and 
Goldman Saches piled into staple food futures markets, which had been deregulated 
in 1999 in the US by the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (Ghosh 2010). 
Billion dollar bets on price rises become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Olivier De 
Schutter (2011), UN Special Rapporteur on food security has linked the 
financialisation of food markets to the global land grab that is driving up the price of 
land rights in many Southern contexts, especially Africa, pushing local farmers off the 
land in favour of transnational exports to the countries with surplus $US dollar 
holdings and inadequate long-term food security, such as China and Saudi Arabia.  
 It is not incidental, I think, that the most influential advocates of market-
based environmental policy are to be found amongst the financial elites that 
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benefitted handsomely from the dismantling of Depression-era banking law and 
public interest legislation, such as the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act. Repealed under 
pressure from Wall St lobbyists and neoliberal economists, these reforms had for 
generations, at least in the West, effectively minimised the situation J. M. Keynes had 
described in the General Theory: 
 
“Speculators may do no harm as bubbles on a steady stream of enterprise. 
But the position is serious when enterprise becomes the bubble on a 
whirlpool of speculation. When the capital development of a country 
becomes a by-product of the activities of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-
done.” (Keynes, [1936] 2009: 142) 
 
Since our concern is the capital development of the biosphere as such, the stakes are 
very indeed. What are we to think of this new political economy of extinction, in 
which in which endangered species will not only be evaluated as superfluous to 
human needs by functional sciences, but will be invested in according to profit or 
‘shorted’ to extinction in accordance with the ultra-short term investment horizon 
of speculative finance? Can the eco-warrior really resolve into the figure of the 
biodiversity banker (Lambe, 2007)?  
 
Highly Connected: Complex Hierarchies in the Financial Ecosystem  
 
In this section we step into the habitat of some of the senior ecologists and bankers 
engaged in articulating an economics of biodiversity and ecosystem services. It turns 
out that while on the one hand bankers such as Pavan Sukhdev are conceiving of a 
comprehensive suite of financial  markets for ecosystems, there is also a coterie of 
senior ecologists engaged in applying cutting edge ecological theory to the analysis of 
systemic financial risk.  
While the two projects are yet to be explicitly articulated, it is fascinating 
that they  form an inverted mirror of one another in which the biosphere and global 
finance markets are to be conflated through the collapse of science metaphors into 
ontology. If the markets for ecosystem services literature ultimately offers 
financialisation as the solution to the biodiversity crisis, the emergence of an 
epistemology of finance as a complex ecosystem in far-from-equilibrium conditions 
effectively naturalises the ongoing financial crisis, obscuring its political origins and 
effects by locating not in the social categories of political economy but in the grand 
temporality of evolutionary biology and the functionalist terminology of second-
order systems theory.  
The mainstream economics profession has tended to adopt a position of 
defensiveness and radical innocence with regard to its intellectual complicity in 
authorizing runaway financialisation (Mirowski 2013), the post-crisis debate has 
nevertheless catalyzed a reappraisal of the neoclassical presumptions of perfect 
information, infinite foresight, instantaneous and frictionless returns to equilibrium 
after exogenous shocks, complete markets and risk-free financial contracts, linear 
predictability and the utter uniformity of  the representative agent, assumptions 
programmed into the computable Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium model, 
which became a mainstay of government and central bank policy making prior to the 
crisis. The GFC has brought to the fore a movement which seeks not to provide a 
radically alternative policy analysis, but to rather to extend and complete the 
refound the ontology of finance and macroeconomics away from the pale imitation 
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of Newtonian physics, to bring financial economics into conformity with 
developments in the science of biological  complexity. 
In 2009, Andrew Haldane, the Bank of England’s Executive Director of 
Financial Stability, argued for the integration of complex systems theory (particularly 
as developed in the field of ecosystems science) into the toolkit of financial 
regulation. Haldane’s commitment was mentored by the veteran systems ecologist 
Robert May, himself an official scientific advisor to the Bank. Unfolding the logic of 
connectivity that is a familiar feature of complexity theory, Haldane highlighted the 
parallels between the contagion effects of infectious disease, the accumulation of 
‘extinction debts’, and the potentially systemic effects of  bank failures occurring in 
critical nodes of the global financial markets: 
 Both events [the failure of Lehman Brothers and the unfolding of the SARS 
epidemic] were manifestations of the behavior under stress of a complex, 
adaptive network. Complex because these networks were a cat’s-cradle of 
interconnections, financial and non-financial. Adaptive because behavior in 
these networks was driven by interactions between optimizing, but confused, 
agents. Seizures in the electricity grid, degradation of ecosystems, the spread 
of epidemics and the disintegration of the financial system each is essentially a 
different branch of the same network family tree. (Haldane 2009) 
 
Haldane went on to suggest that regulators should abandon the general equilibrium 
models of orthodox economics and instead ‘rethink the financial network as a 
complex adaptive system’ characterized by non-linear dynamics and susceptible to 
sudden changes of phase state or so-called ‘tipping point’ during periods of stress.  
Shortly before he delivered his speech, a group of senior ecologists including Robert 
May Simon Levin, and George Sugihara published a paper in Nature which outlined 
the usefulness of complex systems ecology as a model for bankers during the 
gathering sub-prime crisis (May, Levin & Sugihara 2008). This paper had its origins in 
a conference sponsored by the US Federal Reserve to explore New Directions for 
Understanding Systemic Risk, which brought together the insights of financial risk 
managers and systems theorists from the natural sciences to explore the hypothesis 
that ‘[t]he notion of systemic risk in the financial system bears a strong resemblance 
to the dynamics of many complex adaptive systems in the physical worlds’, 
concluding ‘[t]he commonality of stability and resilience to shocks in complex 
systems suggests that approaches to risk management in natural and physical systems 
could be pertinent to financial risk management’ (Kambhu et al. 2007, 56, 7). Key 
speakers included Timothy Geithner, later to replace Hank Paulson as US Secretary 
of Treasury supervising the bailout of Wall Street, and the ecologists Simon Levin 
and George Sugihara. What is distinctive about the interventions of Andrew Haldane 
and others is the fact that the ontological refounding of financial economics in 
complex systems theory no longer functions for them as an argument against 
regulation per se, as it did for Hayek, but as the starting point for a wholesale 
reformulation of financial risk management itself, involving the systematic 
introduction of non-predictive, futurological methods of vulnerability analysis such as 
scenario planning. In the words of Nout Wellink (2009), chairman of the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘the goal of regulatory changes should not be to 
decrease complexity per se’ nor to return to the financial regulations of the past, but 
to make complexity ‘more manageable’ by constraining systemic risk‚ and improving 
the ‘resilience’ of the financial system as a whole. 
The career of the marine ecologist George Sugihara personifies the 
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increasingly seamless epistemic integration of financial and ecological risk analysis at 
issue in this article, and the professional convergence of the conservation biologist 
with the figure of the financial innovator. An expert in the population modelling of 
plankton and fisheries as chaotic, complex systems, Sugihara was “seduced” in the 
mid-1990s by Deutsche Bank, at a time when investment houses were hiring ex-Cold 
War ‘rocket scientists’ and biologists with mathematical modeling skills at the cutting 
edge of science, compared to those of your average economist (Dalton, 2005). After 
several years in their derivatives arm working on a secret ‘black-box project’ to 
develop novel instruments and trading strategies, he returned to the Scripps Institute 
of Oceanography, where he began work on a project to set up market to conserve 
fisheries by allowing fishers to profit from trade in futures and options and catch 
rights. Fish markets are subject to large volatilities of price and catch volume, 
offering ideal conditions for derivative trading which thrives on critical events. His 
outline of derivative contracts for such an exchange are, quite fittingly for the 
privatised knowledge technologies of financial innovation, the subject of  patent 
applications.  
Peter Kareiva, the respected ecologist whose name we recognize from the 
BEF literature, is currently head scientist of The Nature Conservancy (TNC), and an 
author of the methodology of ecosystem services valuation developed by the 
Natural Capital Project. The acronym ‘TNC’ aptly symbolizes the transnational reach 
and corporate organisation of the Big Three conservation NGOs (the other two 
being Conservational International and World Wildlife Fund) which since the mid-
1980s, a period widely noted for the drying up of conservation funds, have come to 
control perhaps a half of the finance available for conservation globally (Chapin, 2010 
) Notably, it was during the 1980s Third World Debt crisis, which precipitated a 
rapid increase in the rate of deforestation in the tropics, as IMF ‘structural 
adjustment’ programs replaced import substitution with ‘export led development’ 
and fiscal contraction, that conservation NGOs such as World Wildlife Fund, 
Conservation International and the Nature Conservancy gained international high 
finance experience in the form of the ‘debt for nature swap’, buying out portions of 
‘distressed’ sovereign debt on secondary markets in exchange for commitments to 
fund protected areas (Reilly 2006). 
Self-described prior to the sub-prime crisis as ‘Nature’s Real Estate 
Company’, TNC eschews the environmentalist role of public policy critique in favour 
of the private bequest and purchase of land for conservation corridors and 
easements. While the effectiveness of this global effort are beyond our present 
concerns, TNC has been accused of not being above some environmentally 
questionable land speculation in a series of articles in the New York Times, of allowing 
oil drilling on donated land, and of involvement in the Bush era Pombo/Inhofe 
rewrite of the Endangered Species Act, which introduced economic criteria into the 
process of listing endangered species and devolved enforcement from the EPA to an 
assortment of local agencies. Academic scientists such as Kareiva and Gretchen Daily 
are well outnumbered on the TNC Board, which includes senior executives from 
the ‘keystone’ predators of the global finance ecosystem: the hedge fund Blackstone, 
Barclays Bank, Goldman Sachs.  The Conservancy’s current CEO, Mark Tercel, was 
previously the executive responsible for the Goldman Sachs Centre for 
Environmental Markets. And while it declines to publish the names of its thousands 
of corporate donors, the advisory ‘Business Council’ listed on the Conservancy’s 
website includes: ExxonMobil, Dow Chemical, Duke Energy, Weyerhauser, 
Monsanto. This is a roll call of corporations who are significant opponents of 
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environmental law, and also funders of low-brow counter-science campaigns through 
neoliberal ‘thinktanks’. As Naomi Klein (2013) has noted, that Conservational 
International and TNC invest considerable portions of their substantial funds directly 
in the fossil fuel sector, which does seem something of an ethical contradiction.  The 
transformation of TNC from a local conservation association to a TNC can be 
thought of in terms of the three-phase neoliberal think tank strategy, which has 
establishes the terms of acceptable political debate on climate  policy by  advocating  
simultaneously, but from different quarters: [1] science denialism, [2] financialisation 
and [3] geoengineering as the only acceptable ‘market based’ approaches to the crisis 
of the biosphere (Mirowski, Walker & Abboud 2013).  
For our purposes, perhaps the most illustrious political insider and figure of 
neoliberal conservation is the billionaire Hank Paulson, who prior to his fateful 
appointment by President G.W. Bush as US Secretary of Treasury, served 
simultaneously as CEO of Goldman Sachs and Chair of The Nature Conservancy 
Board. It is in this capacity that he wrote: 
“[...] It is is clear that a system of market-based conservation finance is vital 
to the future of environmental conservation.” (cited in Levitt, 2005) 
 
Three years later, in a move antithetical to the public neoliberal narratives of the 
small state and efficient markets, Paulson sought from Congress exceptional powers 
of sovereign debt creation and wealth transfer from tax-payers to private banks.  
“The Secretary is authorized to purchase, and to make and fund 
commitments to purchase, on such terms and conditions as determined by 
the Secretary, mortgage-related assets from any financial institution having its 
headquarters in the United States.” (from the original 5 page draft of the 
Troubled Assets Relief Program, 2008)  
 
As US Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke said in 2008 after Lehman’s collapse, 
the risk was that, without immediate, extreme intervention, ‘there will be no 
economy on Monday’. One wonders what kind of crisis would generate an 
immediate intervention to prevent the possibility of there being ‘no biosphere’ next 
century. 
Prior to the GFC, explicit attempts to move economic theory beyond the 
unrealistic assumptions of neoclassical equilibrium had been almost exclusively 
directed at financial price phenomena with the intention of developing profitable 
trading strategists, but in the wake of the crisis,  the Hayekian vision of  the Market 
as complex system spontaneously evolving in far-from-equilibrium conditions has 
arguably come into its own in the sphere of central banking and the management of 
systemic risk, a move which while something of a paradox given Hayek’s hostility to 
the central bank, merely follows the refounding of risk management in the Hayekian 
ontology of resilience, ‘tipping points’, and epistemic limits to prediction that had 
already been accomplished in the spheres of adaptive environmental management, 
critical infrastructure security, counter-terrorism and disaster response  (Walker 
and Cooper 2011).   
The extraordinary resilience of neoliberalism post-crisis, in my view, is partly 
due to its metaphorical shift from equilibrium physics to biological complexity.   
Among neoliberals these days, it is almost de-rigeur to appeal to the evolutionary 
complexity sciences these days, whether appropriately awed by hedge funds and 
their breathtaking productivity of ‘financial biodiversity’ (Lo 2004) or fancifully 
conflating banks with ‘species’, a portion of which are inevitably doomed to a socially 
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useful extinction if only dinosaur governments would stop getting in the way 
(Ferguson, 2009). The lesson is clear, the financial Market is an extension of the 
promethean complexity of the biosphere, and as its moments of destruction are 
inevitably linked to its creative spontaneity. Consequently the financial crisis is not a 
call for the reregulation and subordination of finance to serve social goals (for 
example, the preservation of the biosphere as the founding condition of human 
existence), just an ordinary ‘outlier’ event in a system whose complexity is too 
complex for any human mind to master.  
Given the prevalence of this soporific Hayekian meme, there was something 
refreshing in the study of several experts in the mathematics of network topologies, 
(Vitali et al 2011) whose analysis of newly available cross-ownership data of forty 
three thousand transnational corporations, led them to identify a ‘super-entity’ of 
147 supra-national finance corporations at the core of the global economy. On their 
analysis, these banks and funds exert a profoundly concentrated degree of control 
over the global network of corporations in the ‘real economy’. Indeed, according to 
their analysis, “network control … is much more unequally distributed than wealth. 
In particular, the top ranked actors hold a control ten times bigger than what could 
be expected based on their wealth.” (2011:6). The release of the report co-incided 
with the peak of the Occupy Wall Street protests against the increasing convergence 
of financial and political power in the aftermath of the financial crisis. Journalists 
picking up the story sought the views not, as one might expect, of economic 
historians or political theorists but rather exponents of the mathematics of 
complexity theory. One of these was well-connected financial insider George 
Sugihara, who while admitting that it was “disconcerting to see how connected 
things really are”, nevertheless brought the gravity of complexity science to bear, 
arguing that the study of was “strong evidence that simple rules governing TNCs 
give rise spontaneously to highly connected groups”, and assuring us that there is no 
point worrying about the increasing concentration of political power in a few highly-
leveraged financial behemoths, as “such structures are common in nature” (quoted 
in Coghlan & McKenzie, 2011).  
This was a reference to ‘power laws’, a staple of the Santa Fe ‘complexity’ 
school of financial economics. Sugihara’s common natural structures, however, 
rather trace back to the social sciences, and to one of the founding neoclassical 
economists, Vilfredo Pareto, who developed a logarithmic formula to describe the 
‘natural fact’ that “in all countries and at all times the extreme distribution of income 
and wealth follows a power law distribution” (Farmer and Geanokoplos, 2008). For 
Pareto, inequalities of wealth naturally coalesced around a distribution wherein the 
wealthiest 20% of the population control 80% of wealth, a distribution which while 
alarming on the surface, would be something of socialist utopia in comparison to 
contemporary America. According to a detailed study by the economic sociologist 
William Domhoff (2013), the closest the US came to the Pareto distribution 
between 1922 and 2010 was in 1976, when the top 20% owned only 80.1% of total 
wealth and the rest 19.9%. This was not the least, but the most equitable wealth 
distribution in the surveyed period: by 2010, as a result of the tax cuts for the rich, 
union busting and financialisation of the US economy post-Reagan, 88.9% of the 
wealth was concentrated in the top 20%, with the bottom 80% of people competing 
for the remaining 11.1%. The ‘Pareto Principle’ is widely cited is a prelude to the 
discovery of power laws, which are held to have universal application in theorizing 
extreme deviations from Gaussian probability in events such as earthquakes, financial 






Who will buy the rain?  
 
In 2008 Canopy Capital, a London based private equity firm, purchased the rights to 
market the ecosystem services of the Iwokrama nature reserve, a protected tract of 
rainforest in the Guyana Shield. While the firm and the government of Guyana 
declined to publicize the terms of their agreement, nor to clarify to the forests 
indigenous owners by what sovereign power did the state first exclusively possess 
and then denationalize these rights, it was noted that these ecosystem services 
included the rainfall production, water storage, and weather moderation provided by 
a 1432-square mile patch of rainforest. Canopy Capital suggested it was looking at 
marketing ecosystem services through an ‘Ecosystem Service Certificate’ attached to 
a 10-year tradable bond, the interest from which will pay for the maintenance of the 
Iwokrama forest. 
On the Australian leg of his TEEB world tour in 2010, Pavan Sukhdev put up 
a slide which showed a relief map of the South American continent, and 
demonstrated the necessary dependence on farmers in the temperate crop growing 
regions of the continent on the rainfall generated by the tropical rainforests of the 
tropical north. Noting that the ‘Amazon Rainforest Water Pump’ puts 20 billion 
tonnes of water in the atmosphere, some of which falls on the in the Rio Plata Basin, 
Sukhdev posed the rhetorical question ‘‘what does the granary of Latin America pay 
for its freshwater?”. As your present author, who was in attendance, happened to be 
puzzling through the problem of how Canopy Capital would generate the income to 
meet the coupon payment on its rainforest bonds necessary to attract private 
investment, it seemed that Sukhdev had provided the answer. When I asked him if 
he knew how Canopy Capital intended to exclude non-paying farmers from receiving 
rainfall, he was merely irritated and called for the next question. However, as 
Canopy Capital’s website darkly hints, recalling the disastrous social triage effected 
by the water-privatizations imposed by the IMF and the World Bank upon Bolivia, 
‘[i]f we continue not to pay for this public eco-utility, its services will simply be cut 
off’ (Canopy Capital, 2013). The financialisation of the biosphere is at this point but a 
speculative project to acknowledge the desperate need for investment in 
conservation and restoration in such a way as to disarm any radical critique of 
corporate capitalism in its contemporary finance dominated expression. ‘Ecosystem 
services’  abandons the potentially radical point of view of earlier conservationism, 
which understood ecological breakdown as the result of the dominant economic 
model of permanent growth in conditions of presumed market equilibrium. The 
implication that economic theory and practice would need to accept that the 
‘economy’ was a subset of the biosphere, and the recognition of this would require a 
reformulation of economic doctrines so that they were subordinate to ecology, no 
longer in flagrant contradiction with the biophysical sciences, has been neutralised . 
Something almost the reverse has happened, a process in which ecologists 
themselves have played an essential part. The political effects of the collapse of the 
distinction between money and life catastrophic naturalisation of financial crisis and 
the speculative financialisation of ecological catastrophe. 
In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, no serious reform of the liberalised 
sphere of transnational finance has been contemplated: the socialization of the 
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speculative losses of private banks in the form of government debt, bailouts and 
austerity measures has rather furthered the concentration of wealth in the very 
banks at the centre of the crisis, banks which are also key players in the discursive 
construction of markets for ecosystem services. As evidenced by the ongoing global 
economic crisis, a crisis which has itself  undermined the utopia of an effective 
market-based response to climate change, capital markets are not capable of self-
regulation, much less of determining the ‘optimal’ mix of species and ecosystems 
composing the biosphere. Just as the environment of national economic policy is 
increasing subject to the power of private finance capital and their alumni in central 
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